Cameo is a Canadian registered charitable organization whose primary mission is to conduct humanitarian mine and unexploded ordnance action in war-torn societies. As Brigadier Tonui from Kenya mentioned yesterday, unexploded ordnance has the same effect on the civilian population as landmines, and when I refer to mines I am also referring to unexploded ordnance, or UXO as we call it.

Cameo is currently working in southern sudan, as a partner with operation save innocent lives-sudan (OSIL-s) which has been given the mandate by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to coordinate and supervise all humanitarian mine action in areas under the jurisdiction of the splm. OSILs mandate is similar to that of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), which is not only an overall coordinating authority like the united nations’ mine action centers, or MACs, but also operates its own integral mine action teams. OSIL operates separate and apart from the SPLM, being controlled by a board of directors under the chairmanship of mr. Bethuel Kiplagat, who is a former Kenyan diplomat. Cameo is an advisor to OSIL as well as a quality assurance supervisor and training assistant.

Since the Executive Director of OSIL, Mr. Aleu Ayieny Aleu was not able to be present at this conference, i have been asked to represent him in discussions with other delegates and to answer questions from the floor as best I can. I must state from the outset, however, that Cameo has no politics – we are a purely humanitarian charity which goes wherever it is needed (and funded!), As i mentioned to Major-General Ibrahim of the Sudan delegation yesterday.

Southern Sudan is experiencing a devastating existence. The legacy of landmines is greatly exacerbated by famine in some areas, war in others, and indiscriminate bombing in areas where there has been no ground action for some years now. Community life is not cohesive, and there is very little infrastructure to help to ease the suffering. Hospitals and health posts are primarily operated by international NGOs. The roads are in parlous condition, as well as being mined, and air access is controlled by the government in Khartoum. The capacity of the United Nations’ operation lifeline Sudan to respond to mine emergencies, let alone aerial re-supply, has been interrupted at will by the government and cannot therefore be taken for granted. There are no electrical distribution systems in the communities in which we work and no landline telephones.

Each village or settlement is required to be relatively self-sufficient in mine action response, but any accident away from a town with a medical facility is usually fatal because the time needed to get treatment for the victim is too long. Consequently, our programme aims to create mine action and victim assistance capacity on a community-by-community basis, thereby producing a "made-in-Sudan" solution to their particular problem rather than approaching the problem from the top down as preferred by many donor governments and the united nations itself.

"Top down" thinking is where one begins a country’s mine action by a level one national survey, followed by the country’s establishing national priorities, and then placing local conditions into these national priorities. In Sudan, OSIL is using the "building-block", or "bottom-up", basis, whereby a community which has suffered mine casualties is entered and made secure from mines by teaching mine awareness as well as clearance to the locals, and then they have a cadre from then on to deal with local demining on an emergency basis, much like a firehall responds to fires. We call these teams "mobile emergency response teams", or "merts".

But I digress. The point I had been making for the donor community is that in the same way as African nations individually and severally signed on to the mine ban treaty, donor funding should be considered on an individual need basis and not based on any United Nations overall "formula" or international collective protocol as a benchmark for approval. Recognize the "made in that particular country" solution to that country’s mine problem, and then the country concerned will "own" the plan and be much more committed to it, providing the donor a solid "return on investment".

To extend this point further, in the case of somaliland, for example, why must the wider donor community (as opposed to the few donor countries already represented there) wait for Somalia to come back together, which may take generations if at all, before they invest in the NW portion of somalia which is one of the very few entities in the Horn of Africa to have enjoyed no fighting for the past five years and which has publicly stated its full support for, and agreement with, the Ottawa Treaty? Is there also a similar case to be made for southern sudan??

Let me lead into the topic of information exchange with a personal example. In June 1994, I was asked by the United Nations to go to Angola to set up and manage the United Nations’ central mine action office and prepare a national mine action plan for Angola while that country was still embroiled in its civil war. I prepared the section of the Lusaka peace accords dealing with mine action, and am pleased to say that it was the only section fully agreed to by both sides without debate. The main reason for that was that both factions were very concerned about the safety of their families once the war was over, particularly for those who had been internally displaced.

One item called for in the mine action section of the Lusaka accords was a full information exchange, so that all would be aware of minefields laid during the war and mutually benefit from that information. The UN would then be able to channel its priorities accordingly, and time would be saved from having to complete a national survey before beginning detailed mine clearance of the most critical areas. This frank and free disclosure of mine information began well, in my opinion because of the outstanding reputation and personality of the then special representative for the secretary-general of the UN, maitre Alioune Blondin Beye of Mali (rest his departed soul). However, it required the continuing neutrality of the United Nations to make it work, because there was still considerable distrust between the two warring factions. After two or three months, it became known that one side was not as frank and free with its information as the other side, and this served to re-create a climate of distrust which even the un could not overcome.

Just as I was leaving in july 1995, the UN mine action plan for angola was turned over to the newly established mine action institute, INAROE, by the director of the humanitarian assistance unit, and because INAROE was seen to be run by the government, UNITA became reluctant to continue its participation in the information disclosure. The Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) who had been tasked by the UN to conduct the mine survey of Angola beginning in 1995 took much longer to obtain satisfactory results, and even at that there were insufficiencies in the survey. Now, there has been considerable re-mining, which will require a new survey whenever real peace finally arrives in that unfortunate country. Where distrust on either side is a factor, the un or some other recognized neutral authority must be responsible to safeguard the information received which the side giving it believes to be sensitive to their interests, or such information so essential to the preparation of a comprehensive mine action plan for the region will not be forthcoming.

Another "lesson learned" lies in the area of cooperation between international demining NGOs and the host government. In many cases, where a donor has supported a demining NGO it is because they have agreed with a detailed unsolicited project proposal placed before them by the NGO which the NGO believes will make the best use of the donor’s money in the most critical areas of mine action in that country. The receiving country, however, will have its own priorities for work which may or may not agree with those of the donor as proposed by the NGO. Should there be such a difference of priorities, the host country (or the UN mine action center in the country if there is one) may have to reassure the donor that such a switch has no bearing on the viability of the original project as proposed by the ngo.

When I switched the Halo Trust’s proposed area of work in Angola from Benguela to Kuito, Halo’s HQ in the UK had some serious misgivings, and I made sure that the UK’s Overseas Development Agency (ODA) was fully advised as to the need for this switch, which was needed for reasons which were not known by Halo when it made its approach to ODA. The ODA had no problem agreeing to this change of venue, and it turned out even more opportune for Halo because of the extra visibility it provided to them. Two years later, I noted that Princess Diana, rest her departed soul, had visited Halo in their central Angola location for the whole world to see.

It should be reiterated here that the country which has the mine problem is the final authority for dealing with the problem because it is their final responsibility, and expatriate demining organizations whether charitable NGOs or for-profit companies are specialist advisors and assistants who must recognize such authority. Sometimes, we in the demining community tend to forget this in our zeal to "do what we think is right" .

The NGO will need the backing of the host government in its dealings with the local people, on everything from working conditions to wages. It is preferable to have a nation-wide salary and benefits scale, for example, than to have each NGO left to its own devices to negotiate these. That way, locals will know they cannot gain by trying to play one ngo off against another. Furthermore, the host country should be wary of permitting a salary scale that they could not support when the NGO eventually leaves and they take over the full responsibility with their own mine action center. And still further, deminers wages should not be such that they drain away local professionals because of differential wage scales, because these professionals are essential to fill out a national recovery system, be they doctors, lawyers, engineers, or other professionals. The United Nations with its disproportionately high local wage scales is unfortunately a singularly bad example of such a problem.