Paper
for Presentation at the
Second
Reconstruction Strategies Conference
Hargeysa,
Somaliland
(21-25
July 2000)
On
May 18, 2000, Somaliland celebrated the 9th anniversary of its
independence from Somalia and, indeed, the people of Somaliland have much
to celebrate: in contrast with much of southern Somalia, Somaliland has
established a stable peace, a functional administration, a reasonably
representative government, and a climate for economic growth. Tens of
thousands of mines and unexploded munitions have been cleared; the
majority of destroyed dwellings has been rebuilt, together with much of
the national infrastructure; and over a quarter of a million refugees have
returned home. The burden of this effort has been borne – proudly and
cheerfully – by the people of Somaliland, with only negligible amounts
of international assistance.
The
embryonic Somaliland government, although not without its shortcomings and
difficulties, compares favourably in many respects not only with previous
Somali governments, but also with arrangements for the governance of
Somalis within the states of the region – namely Djibouti, Ethiopia and
Kenya. And Somaliland’s accomplishments offer important clues for the
restoration of peace and government to the rest of Somalia as well.
The
aim of the WSP Somali Programme, and its affiliate, the Somaliland Centre
for Peace and Development (SCPD) was to study these accomplishments,
understand the internal dynamics of Somaliland’s reconstruction, and
share lessons learned with key actors from Somaliland, the region, and the
international community.
WSP Somali Programme / Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development (SCPD)
The
WSP Somali Programme was the fourth in a series of WSP country projects,
which examined the dynamics of post-war rebuilding and the role of
external assistance. The WSP approach involves the application of
Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology to the problems of
reconstruction, in a way that is intended to help identify and articulate
priorities, clarify problems, and build consensus among national and
international decision-makers around possible solutions and policy
options.
In
Somaliland, the WSP programme is implemented through a local affiliate:
the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development or SCPD (Director: Dr.
Hussein Abdillahi Bulhan; Research Co-ordinator: Dr. Mohamed Osman Fadal).
The preliminary research phase spanned the period January-December 1999,
and resulted in the production of “A Self-Portrait of Somaliland:
Rebuilding from the Ruins.” The main research phase in ongoing and is
expected to conclude in early 2001.
Given
that the WSP/SCPD programme is still incomplete, it is not the purpose of
this paper to provide conclusions or lessons learned. It is instead an
opportunity to share some of our observations as we travel the road from
peace and reconstruction to development in Somaliland.
The
Somaliland Self Portrait
SCPD’s
work began with over four months of field research that extended across
Somaliland from Loyacaddo to Laas Canood and from Booraame to Badhan. The
purpose was to sound out the views of a cross section of Somalilanders on
various aspects of social, political and economic reconstruction. In this
paper, I will concentrate primarily on aspects of governance.
Superficially,
it is possible to describe Somaliland as parliamentary democracy with an
executive President, an independent judiciary, etc. The reality, however,
is far more complex and deserves a closer look.
Over
9 years since the SNM’s victory in the war with the Barre regime, and
the declaration of Somaliland’s independence, Somaliland’s governance
structure remains in transition: a hybrid of western form and traditional
substance. The clan system (beelo)
co-exists with imported, western-style institutions.
Some
Somalilanders are content with such a system, or feel that the government
has little choice but to function the way it does: it is simply a
reflection of the society that has created it. Critics, however, accuse
the government of manipulating kinship politics to its own advantage.
Almost all, however, agree upon the need for improvement.
Issues
upon which there appears to be widespread public interest include the
following:
q
Representation
q
Participation
q
Decentralization
Each
of these issues is further elaborated below.
Representation
The
elaboration of a future electoral system is one critical element in
Somalilland’s transition from “beel-based” politics towards a more
formal mechanism for representation. The Deputy Speaker of the House has
expressed the problem as follows: “We need to come up with a system that
accommodates one man, one vote, but allows every community (beel)
to be represented. So far, no one has come up with such a formula. In
particular, the public is divided over whether or parties political
parties might offer a solution to this problem.
Support
for an early introduction of political parties appears to be greatest in
main urban centres where professionals and intelligentsia are often openly
scornful of the beel-system. They do, however, differ over how a
party based system should be introduced, with some favouring elections at
the national level, and others arguing for a more gradual process, with
elections taking place first at the local level.
Outside
Hargeysa, however, interest in party politics is generally low. In Berbera,
community leaders are cautious about the idea, arguing that political
consciousness needs more time to develop. The Governor of Saaxil has
outlined a set of conditions that should be fulfilled before a party
system can function, including full security, full demobilization and
reintegration of militia, establishment of government institutions
throughout Somaliland, and improvement of living standards through the
reorganization/restructuring of the national economy
In
more remote areas, a significant proportion of Somalilanders appears to
favour retention of a beel-based system for the foreseeable future. A
spokesman for the Warsengeli Suuldaan has argued: “If clan is
indispensable, why should we not base our functional structures on it and
use it for our reconstruction and development”. In Sanaag, some elders
advocate a shift “from qabiilism
to regionalism.” In sum, the prospect of party-based politics seems less
compelling to those on Somaliland’s periphery than it does to the people
at the country’s centre.
Design
of the electoral system alone is not sufficient to address such complex
issues. For example, in many areas, pressure exists for the revision of
administrative boundaries and the creation of new districts. A new region
– Saaxil – was established in 1996, but its borders are indeterminate,
and the elders of some communities to the east of Berbera are uncertain to
which region they belong. Officials in Ceel-Afweyne and Sallaxley also
complain that their jurisdiction is unclear, while the mayor of Maydh
feels that his responsibilities are too restricted: “We cannot go beyond
a five-mile radius – not even as far as Sheekh
Isaxaaq’s tomb, which is supposed to be administered from Maydh.”
Boundaries
often have less to do with administration than with representation: many
clan groups want their own “district” as a means to enhanced prestige,
or greater influence upon central government. The proliferation of
districts, however, has little to do with demographic realities, nor with
the capacity of a district to bear some of its own costs. But as long as
politicians and elders seek to extend their political influence through
kinship alone, the pressure to increase the number of districts is likely
to continue.
One
representation issue that deserves special mention is the role of women in
politics. Despite Somaliland’s pride in its tradition of “pastoral
democracy”, its democratic privileges have historically been limited to
men. Whether or not this should change is an issue that divides men and
women alike.
Traditionally,
women have enjoyed no formal role in the clan-based political process, and
today women are not involved in the decision-making process of government
and other public bodies - even those dealing with issues that concern
women directly. Women are absent from the main branches of government
(House of Elders, Representatives, Judiciary and the Executive Branch),
and are also unrepresented in high administrative positions.
Participation
At
the heart of the debates over the constitution, electoral systems and
political parties lies the issue of participation, and the related notion
of equity. In Somaliland, the perception of equity is far more than a
political ideal: it is an indispensable condition for the preservation of
political stability and social peace. History has demonstrated that
Somalilanders are prepared to tolerate all manner of hardships and
political ills – authoritarianism, corruption, conflict and poverty –
but not injustice. The belief that one group is benefiting from the
political system at the expense of others is among the most potent sources
of instability.
Somaliland’s
most fundamental contrasts are those between the centre and the periphery,
and between urban and rural. Hargeysa’s status as the seat of government
has encouraged the concentration of private investment, human resources,
international travel connections, and international assistance within the
city limits. The frenetic, sometimes self-centred preoccupations of the
national capital generate a degree of unease and resentment elsewhere in
the country. Many regional leaders fear that the Hargeysa-based elite has
begun to equate Somaliland’s interests with those of its capital city,
losing touch with the rest of the country. Some voice concerns that if
present trends continue, Hargeysa may one day become as remote from the
majority of Somaliland citizens as Muqdisho once was.
The
degree of inclusion/alienation obviously varies between members of
different clan, and thus between the east and west of the country. In the
words of one Ceerigaabo market woman: “Ood
kaa dheeri kuma dhaxan tirto.”
In Burco, public confidence has suffered acutely from two rounds of civil
strife. “These conflicts have shaken our inspiration for the Somaliland
state,” observes one local leader. “They were a painful experience:
they took away everything we have rebuilt.”
In
Sool and eastern Sanaag regions, populations have long been divided in
their attitudes towards Somaliland. Many are persuaded by the combination
of economic, cultural, historical and political ties that bind them to
Somaliland, but feel that the government needs to ensure a more equitable
distribution of benefits. A man wants to build a fence and is seeking a hangool (a naturally grown stick with a crook at one end and a fork
at the other) with which to do the job. “My problem,” says the man,
“is that I have found the two ends of the hangool
(gadh iyo farraar), each in a
separate tree.”
Resolving
these multifarious, complex and overlapping problems will not be easy.
Some Somalilanders believe that one more round of traditional
peace-making, in the form of a shir-beleed, is a precondition to a more
formal political framework. As one traditional leaders put it:
Before
a final political settlement there should be a turxaan
bixin… a formula acceptable to all the clans. That does not exist
with the present government… [During the 1996 peace process] they wanted
to undermine the unity of the Eastern regions as a political force. So we
had [our leadership] elected by a few people in a room by raising their
hands. Is that justice?
Others
are not so sure. They argue that politics is the art of the possible and
that it will never be possible to satisfy the many competing demands. AS
one cabinet minister has argued: Caano
jiilaal, camba can dareen [In the dry season when milk is scarce, each
cheek feels it is getting less than the other].
Decentralization
One
of the most critical issues in the constitutional debate is that of
decentralization, which emerged as a priority for research within SCPD’s
research programme. At the
National Project Group Meeting, convened by SCPD in November 1999, and
including over 80 representatives from across Somaliland, decentralization
was selected as a priority for further study.
Although
there exists an extraordinarily high level of consensus across the
political and social spectrum that decentralization is fundamental to
Somaliland’s success, there appears to be no consensus on what
decentralization might mean in practice, or how to realize it. Many
Somalilanders are unclear about what the devolution of administrative
authority to the local level would entail. In an unpublished paper on the
topic, one analyst noted that many Somalilanders tend to view the issue
only in terms of “political autonomy – regional self-government –
ignoring the corroborative need for fiscal autonomy”.
In other words, few people realize that if they want local
self-government, they will have to be prepared to bear its costs.
In
sum, decentralization is a complex and delicate proposition. Some
Somalilanders might even describe it as an idea whose time has not yet
come, but others would argue that in the interests of national unity they
cannot afford to postpone it.
In
the course of it’s research on the topic of decentralization, the SCPD
held a first workshop in Baki district, Awdal region in early July 2000.
Participants included members of parliament, the Guurti, the Ministries of
Interior and Planning, regional and district governments, civic
organizations, the private sector, pastoralists and farmers and village
committees. During three days of discussion, the workshop examined various
aspects of decentralization and developed recommendations. Two more
workshops of this nature, on related aspects of decentralized governance
are planned in the coming months, and a working group meets regularly in
Hargeysa to advance the research.
The current situation
Participants
at the Baki workshop described the development of local administration as
an ongoing process, which started from scratch after the Boorame
conference. To date, they have established village committees, and
executive committees at the regional and district levels. There is a
functioning tax collections system, and a generally high level of
acceptance among the local population for the payment of taxes.
On
the other hand, participants described the process as yet incomplete, and
still relatively centralized. Decision-making and appointments of local
officials still take place at the central level. Power is typically
concentrated within the hands of the mayor, and the relationship between
the local authorities and the public was described as weak. Unclear
responsibilities between different levels of government, and between
public officials at the same level have hindered the growth of functional
administration.
In
consequence, workshop participants described a situation in which there
exist unacceptable levels of corruption, overstaffing of local offices,
excessive turn-over of mayors and other public officials, and that
services are concentrated in regional and district headquarters at the
expense of the local population. There was also some concern expressed
that public officials are chiefly preoccupied with satisfying their
superiors to whom they are accountable, rather than to their constituents.
Constraints in advancing
decentralization
Workshop
participants recognized that the process of decentralization faces
formidable challenges. Neither the people of Somaliland, nor their leaders
have prior experience of decentralization, and instead tend to gravitate
towards familiar, centralized patterns of governance. Little or no effort
has been made to raise public awareness about the issue, and many
Somalilanders remain distrustful of any contact with government. Many
public officials are said to lack the creativity and flexibility to
abandon old habits and procedures.
More
concretely, participants agreed that the central government needs to
invest greater effort and attention in decentralization. Furthermore,
while proposals of this nature have been advanced by the executive, it was
argued that the parliament has yet to pass legislation that would
translate the constitutional principle of decentralization into law.
Finally,
some participants emphasized the need for patience, asserting that the
legacy of war and displacement is still very much alive. Confidence and
trust must be restored before people are fully prepared to face such
fundamental changes.
Opportunities
Despite
these constraints, the Baki workshop identified a number of opportunities
to advance the process of decentralization. Perhaps most fundamental was
the realization expressed at the workshop that Somaliland society has a
unique opportunity to build itself from a veritable tabula rasa, and to
learn from the lessons and mistakes of the past.
This
opportunity, they argued, was underpinned by the gradual consolidation of
peace, government administration, and economic activity, as well as the de
facto “decentralization” (or deregulation) of sectors like health,
education, communications, transport and business.
The
workshop also took note of the maturing of Somaliland civil society, and
the justification that Somali culture and Islamic faith lend to a
decentralized social and political structure.
Recommendations
The
full recommendations of the Baki workshop are available through the SCPD,
and will eventually be incorporated into a more comprehensive work. But
there is room here to summarize some of the main points:
q
The central government
(executive and parliament) should take the lead in fulfilling its
constitutional responsibility to effect decentralization, through raising
public awareness, submitting the Constitution to a referendum, and
completing the required legal framework
q
Involve all levels of
government in the planning and developing a framework for decentralized
governance. The framework should include the rationalization of revenue
collection and management at all levels, devolution of specified
authority, responsibility and resources to local levels, and conformity
with cultural and religious precepts
q
Responsibility should shift
increasingly to communities through the election of local councils,
completion of unfinished clan reconciliation issues, and encouragement of
Somaliland’s growing civil society
Conclusions
It
would of course be premature to draw any conclusions at this stage in an
ongoing process. Nor would it be appropriate to describe Somaliland’s
ongoing experimentation in unreservedly positive terms.
Power
remains heavily concentrated in the hands of the executive, vis-à-vis the
legislature and the judiciary. Support for Somaliland’s independence
among various clan groups has been uneven, with some parts of the
territory remaining beyond effective administrative control. Issues like
corruption and human rights continue to engender public debate, and
require constant attention.
What
is clear, however, is that Somaliland is struggling to find answers to
these difficult problems on its own terms – with a modest, but
encouraging degree of success. Somaliland’s political and economic
experimentation holds out the promise of a framework of governance rooted
in Somali society, traditions and culture. It has made slow but steady
progress in developing a framework for governance that is consensus-based,
decentralized, market-driven, and grounded in self-reliance. That is an
accomplishment that most of Somaliland’s neighbours can only aspire to,
and that no other Somali populations enjoy.
Somaliland is struggling to
find answers to those questions on its own terms – with a modest, but
encouraging degree of success. Certainly no government in the region has
done better at providing for its Somali citizens. The peace proposals
being pushed by policy makers in the international community seem destined
to reproduce a politically dysfunctional, economically feeble,
aid-dependent Somali state. If this is unacceptable –as it should be –
then Somaliland’s lonely journey through political and economic
experimentation merits the attention and encouragement not only of the
international community, but of Somalis everywhere. Politically fragile,
institutionally immature, internationally isolated, the hurdles to be
overcome are formidable, and Somaliland’s future is beset with
uncertainty. But it is the uncertainty of choice and opportunity, not the
certainty of failure.