1. A typical national mine action programme consists of five principal sections:

a. Mine Awareness;

b. Mine Survey;

c. Mine Clearance;

d. Victim Assistance; and

e. Resource Development.

Each of these sections can be developed separately, but they must be integrated before the programme can be used fully effectively. The integrating body is the National Mine Action Centre, which sets the mine action policy and objectives, establishes standards, and monitors all mine action in the country, whether done by local personnel or by expatriates, and whether done by humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or commercial firms. The mine action programme is a total programme, including mine action for emergency relief, mine action for infrastructure development, and mine action for natural resource exploitation. To do otherwise promotes inefficiencies, particularly duplication, which result in higher programme costs.

1.1 Mine Awareness is the basic lifeskill required for living in mine hazard areas. It does not consist of only a few lectures and a "pass" grade following the teaching; rather, it is a lifetime requirement for safe daily living promoted through the national education system and followed up continuously by communities. Requiring self-discipline, mine awareness needs to be particularly emphasized in children, daily preferably, and regularly for adults. The presence of mines in a community severely restricts dwellers’ freedom of movement, and mine avoidance discipline must become second nature to all people like the times table is for mathematics.

1.1.1 Like personal hygiene, mine awareness skills begin to be taught at home from the time the child is able to communicate. The community should have mine awareness for children integrated into the schooling curriculum, whether that is in a school itself if one exists in the community or in another form such as in community mine awareness groups. There should be a mine awareness educator in each community who can follow up informal teaching as well as lead the community mine awareness groups.

1.1.2 Methods of teaching mine awareness are as many and varied as any other teaching, depending upon the threshold knowledge level of the people being taught. The aim of the teaching is to place it in the everyday life context of the people being taught, so that it becomes completely integrated into their daily routines. Special methods such as the use of puppet shows, playlets, and videos are also important, because they automatically attract attention. Where there is no electricity, there is no video, so part of any national programme would be to have a "travelling video" - a vehicle fitted with a generator and video which covers a wide area on a scheduled visit basis. The impact of video on those who do not have television in their daily lives is enormous, including a very high retention rate of material taught as well as a "taken for granted" subject authenticity and importance compared to material taught less ostentatiously.

1.1.3 The mine awareness expert need not be a deminer. Mine awareness should not teach technical facts about mines, nor any methods to neutralize, disarm, or remove them. To do so would entice amateurs to tackle the role of the deminer without all the other knowledge and skill the deminer possesses, and cause more accidents. Recognition of mines, however, is very important, as is the discipline to leave them alone and report such sightings to the local mine authority who can deal with them properly. Self-discipline really comes to the fore when one witnesses a mine accident and has to overcome the automatic reaction to race into the minefield to help the victim, but rather leave the suffering victim to go and report the incident and let the local experts extract the victim. Every community in a mine hazard area should have a local mine emergency response capacity, the training and equipping of which is a "must" in any mine action programme.

1.2 Mine survey is the locating, marking, and mapping of landmines, as well as their potential impact upon the community living in the mined area. From a mine survey comes the setting of national priorities for clearance within the resource capability of the country. A national mine survey has three distinct phases:

1.2.1 Level One is a general survey of all communities within the country to determine the number of people, the level of mine pollution, the level of economic activity of the community, and the availability of community facilities such as hospitals, health posts and schools. From this data comes an assessment of the impact upon the various communities should mines not be cleared from that community. These data are weighed against national requirements, and a national impact statement is produced, along with a ranking in priority of areas to be cleared as a part of the overall national mine action programme. This national plan is not absolute; rather, it needs annual updating as a minimum to remain credible and viable - a "living" document rather than a shelf item to be superseded upon demand. Level One should be done by experts in socio-economic surveys with the integral assistance of mine experts. Each surveyor ideally would have had mine awareness education as a minimum, but preferably a full deminer’s training, so he/she can move safely through the assigned areas to be surveyed.

1.2.2 Level Two is the locating of the boundaries of each minefield reported in Level One, along with a representative sample of the number and types of mines in it. Done by professional deminers, this phase also includes spot removals where a very high hazard exists in high usage areas such as roads or water sites. This phase also confirms/modifies minefield information gained during Level One, particularly when the reported location of minefields was based upon locally-accepted rumour rather than on actual mine incidents. It is also at this level that community mine emergency response teams are trained.

1.2.3 Level Three is the carefully planned and coordinated clearance of mines on a national basis, using the Level One Impact Statement as modified from data confirmed and/or enhanced by Level Two findings. A national mine clearance overlay is produced to fit the national map, and areas to be cleared are charted in detail. Estimates are made of each location to be cleared, and donors are sought to fund the clearance either based on their areas of interest in the country or on a global-funding basis. Private enterprise is also encouraged to fund the clearance of the areas in which they intend to operate. Note that such private enterprise clearance must adhere to the national standards for mine clearance, including personal safety, whether they wish to do the clearance themselves or have the clearance done through the national mine action authority. NGOs coming to the country funded separately by donors can be fitted into the national plan’s priorities with complete credibility for their donors. If they come to the country with particular areas in mind to which they have been "assigned" by their donors, these areas of interest can be placed into the national plan or, if they are in low-priority areas according to the national mine survey, the NGOs’ areas can be altered with complete credibility and therefore without loss of donor support.

1.3 Mine Clearance is the physical elimination of the mine hazard, and must be done in order for the country to resume a "normal" environment in which to live, work, and play. It is the most expensive aspect of mine action, and has to be carefully planned in accordance with the national mine action plan and donor support. It is also the slowest aspect of mine action, and can take years to complete. There are four primary methods to achieve mine clearance:

1.3.1 National armed forces should be tasked by the government to clear any and all mines they may have laid themselves during the period of civil unrest, in accordance with the priority of areas to be cleared as determined by the national mine action plan. Assuming that the country’s peace has been stabilized, there will be little reason for the national army to "reserve" certain minefields from clearance for military reasons. Should the army’s interests prevail, these "reserved" minefields must be clearly marked and fenced to avoid civilian casualties. The army should also be required to conform to the national standards for safety, including the use of protective clothing and proper equipment for mine clearance. The taking of chances should be confined to military operations where speed can be of the essence.

1.3.2 A national organization of civilian deminers which can be tasked by the government according to its national mine clearance priorities is the principal means for the country to achieve its own mine clearance responsibilities in conjunction with its national armed forces. The principal impediment to this achievement is funding, because a war-torn country trying to rebuild itself along with its social infrastructure such as medical and municipal services and education normally has little left for mine clearance. The key, therefore, to the implementation of this essential goal is to convince international donors that any funds contributed to this purpose will be spent on that purpose and not for other priorities. This can be achieved in two ways:

1.3.2.1 A National Institute for Mine Action can be established to report to the appropriate minister responsible for national rehabilitation and reconstruction. This National Mine Action Institute (NMAI) would be responsible for coordinating all mine action in the country as well as commanding and administering all national deminers in the same way as a public service organization such as a national railway. When NGOs or private companies come to the country, they would draw on the pool of trained deminers or train their own to the national standard and turn them over to the NMAI upon project completion and withdrawal from the country. The principal problem with this approach is that donors will be reluctant to provide funding to the NMAI without some way to ensure fiscal responsibility and probity. The best way for the NMAI to overcome this problem would be to appoint a Board of Trustees which would include one or more expatriate specialists, particularly financial. This Board would direct the NMAI’s operations and budget in the same way as a Board of Directors controls a private company, and would transparently keep donors (who are the principal "shareholders") abreast of NMAI activities to ensure donor continuing confidence.

1.3.2.2 A National Non-Governmental Organization can be created to plan, coordinate, direct and control all mine action activity in the country. This NGO would operate at arm’s length from the national government much like a national monopoly service corporation such as electricity or broadcasting, yet be responsible to the government’s policy for its operations and maintenance. Directors should be appointed from the donor community as well as the national complement of qualified people. The advantage of this method is that the NGO receives its direction from its Board of Directors which is integrated into the NGO as opposed to being appointed separately by the national government to monitor its activities and funding. Unforeseen political intervention is thereby reduced considerably, allowing for a more continuous and coherent mine action plan based on "neutral" factors as determined by the national mine survey and the overall government policy. It is deduced from this that donor confidence would be enhanced by this method of implementation of the national mine action plan.

1.3.3 International Mine Action Specialist NGOs are the "backbone" of the initial stages of the organization, training, and initial tasking of indigenous deminers. In addition, they are more likely to receive substantial mine action funding than the country in question until it has been able to establish and successfully operate its national mine action organization, whether para- statal or NGO. Even after its establishment, the national organization will rely for some years upon the expatriate NGO community to train its national personnel at all levels of the organization and to advise upon its operations and maintenance. Nonetheless, the national government must ensure that these expatriate NGOs receive clear direction as to where they should conduct their mine clearance operations in accordance with national priorities. Some NGOs arrive in country with a pre-determined set of instructions from their donors, and it is up to the national government, if they have to alter these pre-determined objectives, to convince the NGOs’ donors that the NGO’s services are even more vitally needed in the new areas. Wherever possible, however, the national authority should respect the donors’ wishes, including modifying their own plan as long as there is no critical clash in geographical priorities.

1.3.4 Commercial corporations may wish to employ their own deminers to clear the areas in which the corporation will be working. The national authority should permit this, but ensure that all deminers used by the company are employed in a safe and secure manner. Such deminers must also be trained to national standards and be accountable to the national authority, as well as the company, for their operations. It is natural for overseas corporations to conduct only the bare minimum of non-revenue-producing activity in the country concerned; therefore, the national mine action authority must have an over-riding influence with the national government in the area of deminer standards and safety should there be a dispute between the national authority and the company concerned. As a minimum, the national authority should be authorized to conduct regular quality assurance (QA) checks of the commercial deminers’ operations, and intervene where national standards are being abrogated or abnegated. This action is intended solely to protect the nationals working as deminers for the company. The companies may wish to have expatriate personnel only act as deminers for them, and this should be resisted because doing so will not increase the numbers of indigenous deminers who can be utilized elsewhere once the company has completed its mine clearance requirements.

1.4 Victim Assistance ranges in nature from the immediate sustaining treatment of a mine accident victim and her/his evacuation, to the designing and fitting of prosthetics and the rehabilitation and training of the victim. This concept can be separated into two distinct parts - the assistance to the victim until her/his recovery to a stable medical profile, and the long-term assistance needed to re-integrate her/him into regular society with meaningful personal expectations and capabilities. The former sector is the primary responsibility of the national mine action authority (or demining NGO, if it is their own employee), but the long-term rehabilitation of the victim and her/his reintegration into society with meaningful and attainable expectations and goals becomes the responsibility of the national medical and rehabilitation authorities along with victims of similar injuries which are not mine-related, such as traffic injuries. This paper will confine itself to the initial victim assistance.

1.5 Resource Development is an integral part of the mine action programme, designed to permit a sustained implementation of the programme. It consists of: donor confidence and continuity; personnel recruitment, training and employment; logistics and supply; administration and finance; and management development.

1.5.1 Donor confidence and continuity is the foundation of the acquisition and maintenance of resources. Without continuing donor commitment there can be no sustained mine action programme, and indeed no initial civilian mine action development if no donors come forward. Although this provision would seem to represent a blinding flash of the obvious, some countries have ignored it once they have built up an initial mine action authority and their mine action programme’s implementation has suffered accordingly through donor dry-up. Any national mine action programme must be transparent so that donors believe they are getting a humanitarian return on their "investment".

1.5.2 Personnel recruitment, training and employment is initially done by expatriate NGOs under the general coordination of the government until it has established a national mine action authority. It is not necessary for the government to be the "employer", but when an NGO’s project ends, the government should establish some method of keeping the deminers employed until the next NGO arrives, rather than lose their services in such a vital area. Because it will be incumbent upon the government eventually to take over mine clearance, the pay of the deminers should be set at an amount which the government can sustain upon the departure of the NGO - this is a major point not usually taken into consideration by some demining NGOs. Moreover, if the demining NGOs pay excessively, they can divert professionals away from their primary areas of endeavour (medicine, teaching, etc.) and thereby deprive the country of potential for self-development in these other areas. The United Nations usually pays much higher than the local economy warrants, and diverts professionals from other areas to do lower order, but much better-paying, work. The government should establish appropriate national sustaining pay rates for its professionals and expect outside agencies and organizations to respect these rates when hiring local staff. Training standards for all deminers should be the equivalent of UN standards, and be required of all organizations employing local deminers, whether NGO, private company, or government organization. This way, deminers will be fully interchangeable on all jobs in the country, and will allow flexibility in employment.

1.5.3 Logistics and supply is an area where the national government can be its own worst enemy by applying unreasonable customs duties and other impediments upon the NGOs’ importation of equipment and supplies. It is better to have no duties on such items because NGOs have only so much money to spend, and the more that is taken up in excise the less which is available for demining. Furthermore, if the NGO’s project is delayed unreasonably or taxed unreasonably, the NGOs’ donors might well send the NGO to another country to work rather than continue with their initial project. Such is the metaphor applicable - "killing the goose which lays the golden eggs". Each international NGO should be registered with the national government, and their equipment and supplies brought in duty-free must remain within the expatriate community, removed by the NGO, or ceded to the government upon NGO departure for use by government deminers. If not, then this is the point where excise duties should be applied.

1.5.4 Administration and Finance of a national mine action programme will initially rest individually with the expatriate demining NGOs until the national authority is able to take over the programme. Nonetheless, the national government has the right to know how much outside money is being brought into the country so it can develop a "track record" of expenses for projects and thereby enable itself to better prepare its own budget (expecting a certain outcome for a certain budget level) when the time comes. To satisfy the donor community, the national authority must itself be transparent in its financial transactions by allowing donor audit of their particular interests. The administrative and financial staff of the NMAI usually begin by understudying expatriate administrators and logisticians, who can be provided individually by the United Nations Development Fund or by the donor community’s selecting areas of this expertise that they would agree to recruit and fund.

1.5.5 Management Development should begin as soon as there are sufficient demining activities within the country to warrant the establishment of a National Mine Action Institute. The country should seek to develop this aspect of its national authority by inviting an expatriate demining NGO to help it establish its NMAI by having locals understudy the expatriates until they are comfortable with their capacity and capabilities. Not all demining NGOs have this capacity, and it is preferable for the government to broach this topic with the donor community (or the United Nations Development Programme) separately, with a view to their selecting a mutually-acceptable NGO or private company to fund for this work as a separate project. It is preferable for government mine action policies to be fully established before the NMAI is created and staffed, so that the framework for the NMAI is not subject to continuing change which could subject management duties to continuing revision. This NMAI could be in the form of a National Non-Governmental Organization, and all succeeding references to "NMAI" in this paper should be construed as providing for this option, although the organization and management of this NGO would be similar to the NMAI. Indeed, if the peace is particularly tenuous, it could be politically preferable to have the NMAI as an NGO operating at arm’s length from the national government with a Board of Directors having international representation as a confidence- building measure.

2. The initial stage of building a national mine action capacity consists of:

a. Preparing and disseminating national mine action policies;

b. Establishing the framework and reporting chains for the national authority;

c. Selecting a National Director for the mine action authority;

d. Completing the organization in detail; and

e. Selecting the key personnel for the principal appointments.

This initial stage can be very difficult for the national government, because of its need to balance appointments considering qualifications and political/military realities. There will need to be a representative balance among competing interests in order to ensure the sustainability of the national mine action capacity, and it would be preferable for the National Director to have had prior military service so he can be credible with the army. Mines form part of the country’s defence network, and their removal can be a very sensitive point with the national army. In case of difficulty, the national government could ask the UNDP to choose and fund an appropriate expatriate consultant in consultation with the UN Mine Action Service. This consultant would report to the senior government appointment responsible for the overall national mine action programme, in order to give the consultant the required flexibility in his consultations and recommendations. The advantage to this approach is that the consultant’s advice would be seen as apolitical and unbiased, and hence credible to all interests. The key to the sustained implementation of the mine action programme is the "neutrality" of the programme, so that competing interests do not see the agreement as favouring any particular faction.

2.1 The National Mine Action Institute should consist of the following key sections:

a. Board of Directors/Trustees;

b. Executive/National Director;

c. Headquarters staff;

d. Operations Division;

e. Administration Division;

f. Personnel Division;

g. Finance Division; and

h. Logistics and Transportation Division.

Each Division Head would report directly to the Executive/National Director, with the HQ staff being a coordinating body rather than a directing body. That way, Divisions competing for funding would not be taking direction from a person who was not ultimately accountable for the whole operations and maintenance of the National Mine Action Institute. The Executive/National Director would sit on the Board of Directors/Trustees as the Executive Secretary of the Board, and he could be given a vote depending upon Board members’ preferences.

3. The Second Stage of the building of a national mine action capacity consists of:

a. Obtaining approval from the national government in consultation with all interested organizations, by Resolution, of the organization, personnel establishment and operating rules and regulations of the National Mine Action Institute (NMAI);

b. Approaching the donor community to request initial funding for all, or part, of the NMAI;

c. Choosing key appointments for the NMAI, considering that to be credible country-wide there should be a mutually-acceptable distribution of appointees from both government and opposition factions;

d. Preparing NMAI Operating Instructions and Administrative Rules;

e. Obtaining sufficient infrastructure to form the NMAI (office space, equipment, communications, etc.); and

f. Selecting personnel for "middle management".

Because the NMAI needs to have all available information on mines within the country so that it can plan a mine action programme which is both comprehensive and cost-effective, no competing elements within the country should withhold information. This can only happen when opposing elements within the country have confidence in the neutrality of the NMAI, and this confidence can only be maintained where all sides have, and are seen to have, effective representation within the NMAI. Where the defence element within the government perceives that some of its minefields are strategic and must not be removed, a classified list of their contents can be maintained within the NMAI, but these minefields should at least be marked to ensure civilians do not stray into them. It is for this reason that the NMAI must be credible to, and accepted by, all competing elements within the country, otherwise the national mine action programme will ultimately fall apart or at the least become discredited.

3.1 The overall aim of the national mine action programme is to save the lives and limbs of innocent civilians, and this cannot be fully achieved if some minefield locations are allowed to remain unmarked. This principle was presented to both the Armed Forces of Angola and UNITA in the Mine Action Section of the Lusaka Peace Accords in November 1994, and was fully accepted without modification by both parties, who recognized that their families would benefit directly from a credible and "neutral" national mine action programme. That this initial good will failed later was not due to the principles of the Mine Action Section of the Lusaka Peace Accords but rather to the way the national mine action programme was implemented subsequently.

4. The Third Stage of the building of a national mine action capacity encompasses:

a. the preparation and implementation of a national mine survey to find out what and where mines exist within the country. This information can be initially drawn from international NGOs already working in the country, from the prior competing military elements within the country, and from the local population. The impacts of these minefields are calculated (which ones are likely to be the most devastating to communities and to the free passage of people and goods within the country), and priorities are set for their clearance;

b. at the same time, a national mine awareness programme is formally implemented. Up to that time, there will have been informal mine awareness education being conducted by NGOs and communities within the country as an emergency measure, but this national mine awareness programme will formalize all previous mine awareness instruction in the country and expand upon it on a nation-wide coordinated basis;

c. the activation of the Operations Division of the NMAI is important to begin to coordinate all mine clearance activity within the country from one central location by the national government. At this point, the local appointments assume their places in the hierarchy of this Division, and the expatriate advisors prepare them for their duties. Prior to this point, it is most probable that the expatriate experts coordinated activities themselves, with the local appointees as understudies, or the United Nations officials handled the programme themselves on behalf of the country; and

d. the process of organizing the infrastructure of the NMAI is begun, along with the staffing of the remaining Divisions of the NMAI with the assistance of expatriate advisors.

The key to this Third Stage is the participation of the donor community, not only to provide the salaries and infrastructure for the NMAI personnel but also for the expatriate advisors. At times, this support may well not be forthcoming for many reasons. If it is not, one of the demining specialist NGOs already working in the country should be asked to assist where possible. Such a lack of donor participation at first should not stop the country from proceeding with the building of a national capacity, but rather it should be taken as only an impedance to the speed at which a national capacity would be accomplished. The national government should give some priority to this NMAI from its otherwise scarce resources, because the elimination of the mine hazard in any country is the key to sustaining the peace and the return to a "normal" existence. The "easy way out" of an underfunding dilemma, to turn over the national mine action plan to the country’s armed forces, must be avoided regardless of cost - the national mine action programme is an humanitarian plan, and must be and be seen to be an all-party civilian government undertaking, otherwise the participation of the donor community can not be assured, and the acceptance by the people of the NMAI as "neutral" can not be attained.

5. The Fourth Stage of the development of an indigenous mine action capacity involves the gradual in-filling of the remaining capacities within the NMAI and the recruitment of field personnel to assume the roles played by the expatriate advisors. Nonetheless, one of the first considerations of this Fourth Stage should be the staffing of the Finance and Accounting Division to engender donor confidence and to promote their further participation. All transactions must be transparent, and subject to a full auditing procedure. It is preferable to retain an expatriate advisor/auditor in this Division indefinitely to perpetuate donor confidence. This Fourth Stage could take upwards of five years to achieve, because the most difficult challenge to most war-torn societies is to obtain and retain fully successful management personnel at all levels, but particularly in administration, finance and logistics.

6. Essentiality. It is essential for every country having a landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazard to become self-sufficient in the overcoming and management of this hazard as a first charge to its national rehabilitation and reconstruction plan. That this capacity may take five years or more to achieve in no way abnegates the absolute need to begin to attain this objective in step with the national redevelopment and reconstruction programme. There is not only a humanitarian imperative for having such a capacity but also an economic one.

7. Practicality. This term is synonymous with "the art of the possible". Mine action programmes will rarely be able to follow the ideal "recipe" exactly, because not all of the "ingredients" can be assured. Neither will the ideal sequencing of the plan be assured. It therefore becomes necessary for extemporaneous decision-making and some degree of management risk-taking as the country progresses with its programme. As long as safety is not compromised, the programme can be amended to begin mine clearance without having had the benefit of a Level One Survey, for example. There could be extra costs involved, but if the clearance teams are ready, they should be put to work right away, running the risk of not necessarily clearing for the optimum benefit, but saving lives regardless. Some countries in which internal war is continuing can not find donors for mine clearance but they can for mine awareness. In this case, the mine awareness donation should not be turned down, but rather the programme schedule altered to place mine awareness first in priority, regardless of the urgent and vital need to remove mines rather than just continue to live very constrained lifestyles.

8. Cultural sensitivity is also very important for expatriate NGOs coming to help countries solve their mine hazard problem. The employment of women deminers could offend those who believe women belong only in a family environment, so the local government should give its approval before such a policy is enacted. Equally important is the need to set an appropriate pay scale for deminers so that local professionals such as doctors and teachers do not find it so much more financially rewarding to clear mines that they remove themselves from their original professions in favour of lower-skilled but more well paid jobs in demining. Absolute safety requires absolute discipline, and any cultural practice, such as imbibulation or the chewing of qat, which results in a less-than-full-concentration approach to mine clearance must be prohibited, and the appropriate government representatives’ consent approved before the demining starts.

9. Conclusion. The building of a national capacity for mine action is a long and arduous process, with many interruptions and conflicting requirements impeding progress. Persistence, patience, and the maintenance of the original aim are imperative to ensure that the national objectives are fulfilled in the most cost-effective and nationally acceptable manner possible under the circumstances. The country may have to make serious decisions on how far to go to appease the donor community’s preferences, and if necessary, hold many discussions to obtain a mutually-acceptable compromise. In the final analysis, however, mine action is the sole responsibility of the country concerned and not that of its advisors, and it behooves the donor and advisory communities to fully recognize this imperative and govern themselves accordingly.