Linking Grassroots Mobilizing and Peace Building

The paper describes an approach for managing conflicts and building peace at community and neighborhood levels. It focuses on a bitter dispute within a small settlement (Jeded) in Somalia over whether women should participate in planning and decision-making. That most elders in the community were armed with automatic weapons added to the intensity of negotiations.

Jeded is a small market settlement of 71 households located in one of the most remote regions of Northeastern Somalia (Puntland). Its reason for existence is a 400 meter borehole installed in the 1950s and deepened in the 1980s. Nomads water about 25,000 camels every 14 days on a carefully worked out and regulated cycle. The nomads pay for the water and buy supplies during their 24 hour watering stop, thereby stimulating the economy of the tiny settlement. Jeded’s people, like others in the former Somalia, have been without any government for nearly a decade. No laws, police, banking, education, or health programs have operated since 1991.

In an effort to strengthen capacities of community institutions for planning and action, the German aid agency, GTZ, launched an ambitious regional rehabilitation and reconciliation program in 1993. A portion of the program sought to improve institutional capacities at local levels to undertake their own data collection and analysis, planning, monitoring, and conflict resolution. A combined US-Somali team spent three weeks in the summer of 1994 living in Jeded along with 30 Somali representatives of indigenous non-government organizations (NGOs). The goal was to impart skills to local NGOs for community-based planning. Since the training, although GTZ has withdrawn from the region, the local NGOs have spread the approach to 125 additional villages and are now preparing district resource management plans to reflect priorities that individual villages desire. This link of local planning and regional coordination offers hope to bring orderly governance to the people of Somalia. The case example suggests a model for use in other tension-filled settings.

Use of local planning and conflict management tools rests on several assumptions:

1. conflict is all-pervasive: conflict exists in every neighborhood and community, north or south, rich or poor, tropical or temperate, agricultural or industrial;
2. existing conflict mediation focuses mostly on national and international concerns: most conflict mediation techniques are focused on resolution of national or international disputes and include tools such as direct negotiation, third person intervention, multi-stakeholder objectives planning, and cross-cultural communication. This case example suggests a model for use in more local settings that have become tension-laden. The Jeded approach assumes that too little attention has been paid to local-level conflict resolution;
3. local tools are also important: methods and techniques to mediate national disputes are not automatically applicable to local levels. Without explicit attention to local disputes, use of national-level approaches is of questionable value. Further, any national agreements that are negotiated independent of local institutions may be founded on a bed of sand;
4. integration of mediation with local planning and action is effective: for local communities, methods for conflict mediation should not exist separate from basic tools to manage and develop a community’s natural resource and livelihood systems;
5. traditional methods of conflict mediation are important but may be inequitable: while many communities already have traditional means to resolve conflicts, these systems may reflect inequitable power balances within that community, including discrepancies of benefits based on gender, class, age, or ethnicity;
6. exploration of alternative methods is needed: when a community’s traditional power elite is party to the conflict, methods alternative to traditional approaches are needed as the elite may use their positions of power to settle the conflict in their own favor. The result may not be mediation but, instead, repression of the unempowered and marginal people of the community;
7. elites still important: yet alterative approaches cannot bypass the traditional elite as the old power structures have ways to subvert such processes in their communities;
8. new tools to blend traditional and alternative approaches represent a way to bring old elites and previously unempowered community members together to accomplish both conflict mediation and development: the challenge, therefore, is to bring new tools to the community that give voice to groups not previously heard, that develop shared goals for action among the old elite and newer voices, and allow settlements that bring a sense of ownership to all parties within the community.

An example from Somalia illustrates how the system has worked in the past. A section on lessons learned suggests how the approach may be extended to other groups in the future.

In the early months of 1991, Somalia experienced an unprecedented event, unlike any other nation in the 20th century. The state collapsed. It was not simply a military coup or a revolutionary replacement of a decayed and ineffective dictatorship. Nor was it a new radical regime coming to power through a partisan uprising. It was the full and total collapse of the state. It surpassed the recent crises of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Rwanda/Burundi as it involved a full and total collapse of the state, including:

... evaporation of army and police units;

... disintegration of the civil service bureaucracy including all communication, health and social services;

... looting and destruction of the banking system;

... systematic elimination of private facilities such as hospitals, offices, hotels, and utilities;

... total collapse of the modest rural extension services;

... breakdown of court and penal systems.

Local groups have moved to fill this void. In the Northeast (self-declared Puntland Republic) as well as the Northwest (self-declared Republic of Somaliland), elements of a fractured civil society, led by traditional clan and religious elders, have emerged to perform a number of previously state- monopolized functions. Supported by youth and women leaders, Councils of Elders have beefed up the slender governance institutions such as the SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front) in the Northeast and the SNM (Somali National Movement) in Somaliland. In these areas, one witnesses the steady evolution of fragile public and NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) institutions led by voluntary and often part-time functionaries. While some criticize these new "state" institutions as unworthy of recognition, others see Somalia/Somaliland as leaders on the cutting edge of the wave of decentralized governance reform. This phenomenon is particularly manifested at the regional, district, and village levels. It almost seems that Somalia has opted to enter the 21st century by passing through a decade of the 19^th.

During the past few years, the United Nations as well as international donors generally have ignored regions such as Somalia’s Northeast and Northwest, where local residents have begun reconstruction on their own. In these areas, one notices thriving, small-scale, private sectors led by women traders who provide support services, including banking. Some argue that target-specific external assistance to these local and decentralized initiatives should become the primary approach to Somalia's rehabilitation and development, ignoring the lack of a national government. Others contend that the presence of foreign aid serves only to intensify factional fighting. Therefore they suggest that foreign development assistance for Somalia should be limited in Somalia until there is a cohesive and effective national government.

The issue is neither to limit nor to expand external assistance. Instead, it is a question of its type, quality, and modality of assistance. Attracting more donors would help diversify funding sources. Establishment of community development funds, complemented by revolving women's loans, might help to spread benefits. Given present circumstances of extreme scarcities, the priority task seems to be one of developing new methodologies that lend themselves to decentralized planning and implementation. In this way, a community-based approach can get on with the business of Somali development. Insofar as there may be many more Somalis coming on line in Asia, Africa, the former Soviet Union and perhaps elsewhere, the concept of decentralized mediation takes on even greater importance.

Jeded is a village of nomads. Founded in 1954 because of a new well and good grazing, Jeded has become an important watering point and provisioning station for a large nomadic community. One elder estimated that over a million animals are watered at Jeded's borehole every year. The name "Jeded" literally translated means "many paths." The origin probably lies in dozens of tracks that proceed east from the district capital of Gardo. Fifty years ago, these roadways passed through wooded plains that stretched from Gardo to beyond Jeded.

Today, Jeded’s landscape as well as the surrounding area is no longer wooded. Instead it is now bleak, hot, dry, dusty, windy and at times overwhelming. For example, during the three weeks of the PRA team's residence, daily winds would rise to 60 to 80 kph (40 to 50 mph) making any outdoor meetings or discussions virtually impossible between the hours of 9:00 am and 4:30 pm.

Jeded's soil productivity is marginal. Rains are unreliable. Precipitation averages a meager 50 mm (2 inches) per year. While it is hard to imagine a rainfall regime of such extreme aridity, a few weeks residence in the village will document its accuracy. Of this sparse rainfall, upwards of 80 percent comes between the months of April and September. As a result, the residents constantly complain of declining vegetation, rapid runoff, flash floods, and severe soil erosion. Elders described a succession of droughts and famines that have afflicted the village since it’s founding. While it is hard to judge which droughts and famines were the most severe, all agreed that the years of 1954, 1968, 1974, 1983, and 1989 were difficult.

In spite of these hardships, the combination of a central location, a deep borehole, hundreds of nomads with thousand of animals, and water scarcity elsewhere in the region makes Jeded a significant economic force. Italian colonial officials recognized these factors and drilled Jeded’s first borehole in 1954. They returned as agents of foreign technical assistance and drilled the second borehole in 1985. The wells have brought a mixed blessing to Jeded. In one way, the wells document a Somali saying "water is life." In another, they have contributed to severe devegetation and resource degradation.

Jeded's location 60 kms. (90 minutes by dusty road) east of Gardo straddles the main road to Bender Beila, a small fishing village on the Indian Ocean. While there is only occasional traffic on the road, it is clear that Jeded is an important warehousing depot for the region. Two or three trucks appeared almost every day, usually bringing supplies of sugar, cooking oil, salt, cloth, and small personal items such as batteries, flashlights, matches, soap, and sandals. About half the trucks left empty; the other half carried goats, camels, and sheep to market, usually at the port of Bosaso, the regional capital 300 kms. to the north. Other important towns within a few hundred kms. in the Northeast are Garowe, Galkayo, and Iskushuban.

Jeded residents earn a good living selling these commercial products and foodstuffs to the nomadic herdsmen who visit the village regularly. There are two levels of nomadic visits. One group are those keeping sheep and goats and a small number of cows. These herders schedule their grazing to include a watering stop at least once every two days and, in the very hot season, every day.

A second group are the camel herders. These nomads require water every 12 to 14 days for their herds and are far more independent than the small ruminant herders. The camel herders will range up to 100 or even 150 kms. from the borehole, making contact only as water needs demand it. The herds tend to arrive in Jeded in the early morning -- between 5:00 am and 8:00 am -- staying until noon. While the animals are watered, the herders visit the shops, buy provisions, and exchange news.

Jeded’s economic transactions are unusual as little actual cash changes hands. The herders receive goods and food staples in exchange for obligations of livestock. They also receive water from the borehole on the same livestock-obligation basis, at an equivalent rate of about US $ .25 per camel per day's drink. The payments for both water and goods are accounted for in a complicated form of livestock indebtedness.

When the shopkeepers need more supplies from the truck owners or when the borehole management committee needs fuel or replacement parts, they pass on their livestock debts to the truckers, in exchange for fuel or merchandise. The truckers then collect their "owed" livestock from the herders, take it to Bosaso for export where they sell it for cash to animal exporters, and then use the money to maintain their vehicles as well as buy new provisions. While it seems unusual in the 1990s to operate an active economy largely on a barter basis, when one considers the interconnections among families and clans in the region, the barter system actually works quite well.

While the economic stimulus from the borehole is welcome, there are also severe problems. The small ruminants, while a good income-generating investment, exact a heavy toll from the environment. There is no grass for miles from Jeded, other than a few specially fenced and closely guarded grazing lots that some families have maintained. In addition, there are few trees as the abundant water has attracted many more people than the original landscape could support. Need for building materials, fuelwood, and small implements has long ago eliminated the trees.

The result of the deforestation and loss of vegetation is twofold. In the months of July and August, the winds are almost unbearable. Starting in mid-morning, the gusts bellow and blow with such force that it is impossible to do much of anything out of doors. The PRA team could hold no village meetings until well into the evening hours; tea shops and informal village restaurants closed from 10:00 am to 4:00 pm; school stopped; the village football matches were canceled; any form of outdoor construction or building activity was fully immobilized. Even to walk across the village open spaces at mid day or to try to cook lunch was difficult and, on some days, impossible.

The second problem is flooding. To think of a problem of floods with an annual rainfall of 50 mm seems ironic. Yet it is a hard fact of life for Jeded. The rains that come in the months of April to June are intense and heavy. They drench the land and quickly create large pools. Jeded's chronic devegetation and loss of trees and grass cover provides no barrier to these pools and within half an hour, surging torrents of water cascade through the village. The hard soil just below the sandy surface absorbs water very slowly. The result is flash flooding which digs deep gullies into the soil, carries off what little vegetation may have survived the goats, and threatens to wash away even the sturdy stone houses in Jeded.

Thus, while the borehole water brings life to Jeded, it also brings death to the trees, vegetation, soils, and perhaps one day to the village itself. While residents are keenly aware of the problem and can articulate the relationship between the well and the resource degradation, they are in no position, household by household, to take initiatives to solve these problems.

Agriculture is largely impossible in Jeded. The village derives almost all of its livelihood from livestock, including selling provisions and water to the nomads who frequent the borehole. It is hard to estimate the total volume of livestock trade or full benefit of these sales to the village of Jeded. Local estimates of livestock population for the Bari region include one million camels, three million sheep and goats, and about 100,000 cattle. Annual livestock exports from the entire region include about 20,000 camels and 150,000 sheep and goats, mostly through the port of Bosaso.

During the month-long residence of the PRA team in Jeded, several different trucks were loaded with sheep and goats for export to Bosaso. Medicines for vaccination appeared with the trucks and animals graded, inoculated, and loaded in an extremely efficient manner. The process suggested that such loadings were done frequently.

Another note of interest was news from one herder that Saudi Arabia had recently returned a full shipload of Somali livestock, claiming they were all infected with disease. While the herder had no animals in that shipment, he expressed concern that Jeded was in desperate need of improved veterinary services to protect his exports from return. Veterinary services were noted, as one of Jeded’s major needs in the Community Action Plan.

From one perspective, Jeded is a very small village. Its 71 houses are concentrated near the old well and along "Main Street." Figure 2 – the village sketch map – provides details. The original sources of water, from the 1920s, were shallow and hand dug wells that the earliest residents had installed. These wells were unreliable; their output varied directly with the intensity of the rainy season.

The new borehole of the late 1980s was deeper – villagers say 400 meters, though a water specialist in Gardo said the deepest well in the Northeast was 300 meters. The diesel pump has run almost continuously since installation with only a few mechanical problems. While spare parts are in short supply and while there is continuing need for maintenance, the pump manager has provided a steady source of water.

Another had been in the army. As the politics of Somalia turned sour, he encountered clan-based challenges that questioned his political loyalty. He was arrested and sentenced to two harsh years in prison. When released in the late 1980s, he fled to Jeded, the village of his wife's family. Now he is a contractor, building houses, schools, clinics, and roads. He makes his home in Jeded though manages contracts in many distant communities. He spends about one third of his time in Jeded.

A third was a policeman. He had served in posts all over the country. While his wife was from the Northwest (Somaliland), his roots were in Jeded. In the early 90s, with the disintegration of government and the police, he came back to Jeded and became a businessman. Drawing on old contacts and networks from his police days, he spends much of his time traveling, buying, and selling merchandise as he travels. He visits Jeded and his family two or three times a month.

A few enterprising villagers have started a new business. They have constructed their own water reservoirs – berkeds – that are cement lined water storage tanks installed in the ground. The owners have built elaborate drainage channels from the neighboring hillslopes – 1 to 2 kms. away – to the berkeds to channel runoff directly into their tanks. The berkeds hold a great deal of water, being approximately 2 to 3 meters deep 5 meters wide, and perhaps 10 meters long. While they look like an inviting place for Jeded's children to swim on a hot day. One suspects that any child who tried it would be severely punished.

At present there are close to ten berkeds in Jeded, all located about a half kilometer west of the village. During the rainy season, the berkeds fill with fresh and sweet water. The owners sell it to villagers and livestock owners over the remainder of the year for the equivalent of a few dollars a barrel. While berked water is not a large income generator, it does provide a steady source of cash for small needs and expenditures. For example, owning a berked was identified as one of the criteria for making a family "rich" in the village.

At the core of Jeded’s and Somalia’s existence lies the clan system, interfaced with deep commitment to Islam. Cherished for centuries; called upon for virtually all aspects of commercial, political, and social relations; and providing a clear organizational structure to manage daily life in the village, the clan and sub-clan system, linked to 800 years of Islam, is the most powerful force in Somali development. Clan structures cut in both negative and positive directions.

On the negative side are feuds and disputes between and among groups that have been at least one contributing factor to Somalia’s present political impasse. The current dispute over control of Mogadishu – 800 kms. south of Jeded – has become more intense because of sub-clan loyalties. Although both sides belong to the same clan family, each faction draws support from different sub-clans. Thus the core of the political party definitions and therefore the political conflicts are defined through clan and sub-clan allegiances.

Similar situations exist in other parts of Somalia where traditional rivalries and tensions among clans and sub-clans have existed for centuries. In Berbera, for example, the competition is over who shall collect the port fees and in Hargeisa, the dispute centers on which clan will be responsible for collecting and disbursing airport fees.

There is also a positive side to Somalia’s clan structures. Three are important for this study and subsequent work in Jeded. The first is management and political governance at the village level. In Jeded, stability is maintained by allegiance to the Council of Elders, a clan based institution that literally transcends time. When the former government collapsed in 1991/92 in Mogadishu, there was little change in Jeded because the elders were in control.

When the Ministry of Water could no longer maintain the village pump, the elders took over. When the Ministry of Health stopped supporting the village nurse and clinic, the elders negotiated an agreement with UNICEF. Drugs and medicine have been coming at periodic, though irregular, times over the last two years.

Another dimension of village management concerns resolution of conflicts inside the community. Marital, legal, property, family, and commercial disputes within the village all come before the Council of Elders. For example, a marriage contract can be broken in Jeded, but only after the elders have considered the case and granted a ruling according to Islamic family law, perhaps with recommendations relevant to the particular situation. Normally these rulings are fully and promptly obeyed as the elders have the full respect of virtually every part of the community.

Second, Jeded’s main sub-clan grouping provides a regional governance structure. Allocation of grazing rights, protection of stock, maintenance of civil order within the sub-clan’s territory, and organization of commercial exchanges, especially livestock trading through Bosaso, are sub-clan duties. In the case of Jeded, if there should be a water or grazing disagreement between two neighboring villages, elders from several communities would meet to hear the grievance(s) and make a ruling. These traditional courts enjoy almost total respect of sub-clan members; their rulings are rarely questioned.

Finally, through the clan structure, local councils of elders negotiate agreements between sub-clans on a regional basis. In one sense, each sub-clan has its own Chair, Ministry of Interior, Foreign Minister, and Treasurer. This quasi-governmental arrangement makes possible a regional "legislative, judicial, and executive" system that generally has the support of the people. The clan model has worked reasonably well for the Somaliland Republic, especially during and following the five month deliberative session held at Borama in 1993.

In 1994, the combined US - Somali training team spent three weeks in Jeded, along with 30 representatives (22 men and 8 women) of Somali NGOs from the Northeast. The goal of the visit was to carry out a complete community-based assessment, beginning with participatory data collection and concluding with a community action plan. Details of the process can be found in the PRA Handbook and PRA with Somali Pastoralists, both listed in the bibliography. The training was based on the premise that conducting a complete assessment in an authentic community setting would serve as an excellent training experience for the Somali NGO staff as well as test whether participatory action planning could function in a society where there was no government.

For the first two weeks, the community assessment progressed smoothly. Spatial, temporal, economic, institutional and technical data were collected, problems identified, assets to deal with each problem considered, and a ranking process begun. In keeping with the Somali tradition in rural communities, men and women generally met in separate groups. The eight women from the NGOs and 2 to 3 men met with the women. The rest of the NGO group divided into two smaller units with half meeting with the village elders and the other half dealing with Jeded’s youth group (young men not yet married, generally between the ages of 18 and 25).

The three groups assembled separate data sets and listed their own versions of causes. A Steering Committee consisting of three to four NGO representatives and three to four villagers integrated the data, working in small groups. While there were some rumblings from the men as to why the team was interested in what the village women thought, the process was generally peaceful. While a few of the men brought automatic weapons to the meetings, it was only because they lived some distance from the village center and the meetings were held at night to accommodate work schedules and to avoid the heavy winds.

Given the tranquil data collection meetings, the Steering Committee opted to put men’s and women’s groups together for the ranking exercises. The purpose of the ranking is to build ownership of the group’s decisions about the community’s most severe problems. The rankings are then used to gain village consensus about which problems they will attack first and which groups in the village will take the lead.

The ranking session, announced for 7:00 pm on the 12th day of the Jeded assessment, turned out to be an extraordinary meeting. Whereas about 20 villagers had been coming to each of the small group sessions, 125 residents showed up for the ranking. Given that there were only 71 households in Jeded, this was a remarkable turnout.

The numbers were divided almost equally between men and women. The men, accustomed to playing a dominant role in such meetings, sat in front. The women, buoyed by confidence-building sessions during the first 10 days, came forward along the sides of the group and sat as close to the front as possible.

One of the Somali NGO staff chaired the meeting. He explained how pair wise ranking worked and then moved to the list of Jeded’s identified problems. Within ten minutes it became clear that the women and men held different perspectives on priorities. Women wanted investments in human health and income generation. The men favored wage employment and assistance in animal health. The ranking continued, voices grew louder, speeches by individual men and women became longer and more animated, the level of tension mounted.

Finally, in a peak of tension, three of the village elders (male) stood up, announced that including women in the ranking process was "bullshit," and stormed out of the meeting. The next day, the NGO group tried to reconstruct whether the departing elders did or did not have weapons with them. No one could say for sure – a factor of how normal the presence of AK-47s had become in every part of Somalia. In any event, if the three did have weapons, they made no gesture or effort to use them to enforce their will on the meeting. Needless to say, the ranking session ended within a few minutes of the walkout. While results were determined and a rank order of priority attached to the list of problems, it had become clear that the gender issue was approaching an explosive situation.

The next morning, the NGO and training staff assembled at the daily scheduling meeting, along with a few of the elders. None of the village women attended, stating that they were busy with domestic duties. For the record, it may be helpful to point out that Jeded’s women had not come to the previous scheduling meetings, only the data collection and analysis sessions.

Debate about what to do among the NGO representatives was as intense as the previous evening’s ranking turmoil. While there were as many opinions as speakers, the positions came down to two, divided equally in gender with roughly ten men and four women from the NGO group on each side.

The first group stated that community-based planning was too "progressive" for rural Somali communities and should be terminated. Bringing men and women together for decision-making was against Somali traditions. Importing outside ideas into Somalia, they argued, was what had caused the collapse of the government in 1991. Somalia, they stated, should return to concepts and ideologies of the past in which men and women maintained separate duties. In this setting, concepts of the dignity and respect of traditional Somali values would prevail. The NGO groups should apologize to the elders and women, the first group concluded, cancel the village assessment exercise, forget about community-based development, and go home.

Not so, said the second group! Somalia was not a cultural island divorced from the rest of the world. Times were changing, both outside and inside Somalia. It was no longer 1900 but almost 2000. It was time, the second group asserted, that Somali elders recognize that women had important things to say, significant contributions to make in village decision-making and perhaps most crucial, a right to express themselves in private and public gatherings. This second group, including men and women from the NGOs, saw the community assessment as an opportunity to bring the elders up to date with global development thinking. In some ways, the tensions between the two NGO groups were more pronounced than those among villagers in the ranking session the previous evening.

What to do?

The three elders had voted when the walked out. The NGO group was hopelessly divided. The rest of the elders were most reluctant to say anything lest it be interpreted as a criticism of the three who had departed. Most of the village women were also mute, mostly because they were caught between allegiance to an old model and curiosity about a new one. The Steering Committee – some NGOs, some villagers and the US-Somali training team – emerged as the only vehicle for amelioration. While no formal "method" was available, the momentum of trust established during the first two weeks provided a base upon which to build a solution. The Steering Committee crafted a plan to open discussions. The eight Somali NGO women agreed to talk with the village women. The males from the NGOs would do the same with the two men’s groups. The agendas were not open ended. Instead, each NGO team was asked to develop a list of its constituents’ highest priority needs. In some ways, this was a reversion to single group planning rather than community consensus building. The Steering Committee was assuming that the integrated ranking exercise had pushed the community’s three groups beyond their comfort level. That evening, the three groups met individually.

The women and the youth came to consensus quickly and easily. Their priorities were:

women: water, health, credit/income generating activities

youth: education for the village’s school-age pupils –

men and women: flood control/soil erosion management, water

The men’s group had more difficulty. At one level, they wanted to get on with the business of restoring Jeded’s prominence of the 70s and 80s when it was a major economic asset for the region. On the other hand, they wanted to maintain control of village decision-making and management. After extended discussion, the men determined that their priorities were two-fold: at one level they wanted increased wage employment, improved access to water, and better medicine and veterinary service for their camels, sheep and goats. At another level, the elders wanted to preserve their management and control of the village. They wished to honor the traditions of their fathers and grandfathers. It was important for them to be known as a council that had preserved the values and traditions of their treasured cultural heritage.

The three NGO teams brought reports back to the Steering Committee. The committee met the next morning – now 36 hours since the walkout. After hearing each group report, the Steering Committee began to develop a proposal. First, they agreed that the elder’s traditions be honored and provisions made that they maintain their ultimate decision-making authority for Jeded. Second, the Steering Committee proposed that a new intermediate group – called the PRA Steering Committee – be created. This group would be charged with managing development of Jeded and to looking after priorities of all project committees (called task forces) within the village. It would consist of three members each from the three village groups – women, youth and elders– and delegate project responsibilities to constituent groups. Women would look after project activity in human health and income generation and share responsibility with the elders for water. The youth would assume responsibility for education and soil control and pass their management interest in water to the elders and women. The elders would share water with the women and assume direct responsibility for wage employment and animal health. As a final piece of the agreement, the PRA Steering Committee would report to the elders. A short addendum to the agreement noted that the women interpreted "water" to mean potable water and the elders assumed it meant keeping the borehole going to water their 25,000 camels, sheep and goats.

Figure 3 presents details of the agreement in diagrammatic form. The Steering Committee created this diagram as a means to communicate quickly and effectively with the full community. A meeting was called for that evening – now 48 hours from the walkout. In particular, the Steering Committee met with the three elders who had started the crisis and sought their endorsement of the plan. Because the three had been party to the discussions of the previous 48 hours, they willingly offered their support.

The final meeting was delayed by 24 hours as a concluding assembly for the assessment process had already been scheduled. While approval of the new village management structure was assured (there

was no need to take a formal and final vote) because each of the three groups had already endorsed the process, it became a time of celebration and affirmation of Jeded’s unity. Bonfires were built, speeches planned, and food prepared. The entire community attended to share in the celebration. The actual Community Action Plan was prepared and included each of the priority areas, as individual groups had previously agreed.

The tension of three nights earlier had dissolved. The elders were still the major decision-making body for the village; the youth had a new role not previously bestowed upon them; the women, too, had a new range of responsibilities.

The Jeded process of planning and conflict resolution has now been extended to many more communities in Somalia’s Northeast. United Nations and international NGOs have formed partnerships with many of the communities using the method. Discussions are getting underway to develop regional action plans in the Northeast, based on the aggregation of many individual community plans. There is even discussion of using the cooperation on village action to serve as a basis to develop a regional governing council. While the overall well-being of Somalia continues to be uncertain, the means to meet development needs of approximately 125 communities in Bari, Iskushuban, and Garowe are working.

integration is needed: Conflict resolution works if it is part of a larger community development exercise.

 

visual instruments draw in those who are under-empowered and build trust: Use of visual instruments for data gathering, analysis and action planning drew in individuals not usually heard – in this case the women of Jeded – and established trust.

 

trust forms the basis for negotiation: Trust established in the first two weeks that focused on analysis and planning formed the basis for willingness to negotiate compromise in the third week.

trusting negotiation can lead to compromise: Compromise is therefore possible if trust is previously established.

orderly change is possible: Old elites and power structures are prepared to change, but only if the change enables them to save face and only if it is built on a solid foundation of trust and ownership.

 

These lessons suggest that changes in traditional values and practices can be introduced at grass roots levels where they will be supported and sustained. In the case of Somalia, the lessons suggest that failure at national levels to negotiate settlements among 26 warring factional leaders may be reversed by starting with local communities. Conflict mediation from the grassroots may reach the center more effectively than such mediation from the center can reach the grassroots. These lessons may have applicability in other parts of the world as well.

Adam, Hussein and Richard Ford, "Removing Barricades: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation in Somalia" Working Paper in Peaceworks Series of the United States Institute of Peace, October, 1998

Adam, Hussein and Richard Ford, (eds.) Mending Rips in the Sky: Exploring Options for Somali Communities in the 21^st Century, Red Sea Press, 1997.

Drysdale, John, Whatever Happened to Somalia: A Tale of Tragic Blunders. London: HAAN Associates, 1994.

Farer, Tom, War Clouds On the Horn of Africa. New York: Carnegie, 1976.

Ford, Richard, Hussein Adam, Adan Yusuf Abokor, Ahmed Farah, and Osman Hirad Barre, "PRA with Somali Pastoralists: Building Community Institutions for Africa’s Twenty-First Century," Program for International Development, Clark University, December 1994.

Laitin, David and Said Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

Lewis, I.M., A Pastoral Democracy. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Lewis, I. M., Understanding Somalia: Guide to Culture, History and Social Institutions. London: HAAN, 1993.

Markakis, John, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. London: Zed Books, 1990.

Nelson, Harold D. (ed.), Somalia: A Country Study. Washington: United States Government, 1982.

Samatar, Abdi, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884 - 1986. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.