THE INSTITUTE FOR PRACTICAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING

                

 

 

Antipersonnel Landmines: Friend or Foe of the Military?

Robert G. Gard, Jr., Lt. Gen., USA, Retired

Military Advisor, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

 

Let me start with an analysis of the landmine issue from a military point of view. For me, the relevant question is whether the military utility of landmines exceeds the problems they create, not only for innocent civilians but also for the soldiers who employ them.

It is understandable that military professionals responsible for conducting combat operations instinctively want to retain the option to employ any weapon that might provide even a marginal military advantage in a limited number of situations. This appears to be the case even if the use of the weapon may on balance be disadvantageous to the side that employs it. To justify retention of such a weapon, military proponents are inclined to exaggerate its military utility and effectiveness. I believe this to be the case with antipersonnel landmines, both in the United States and elsewhere.

Antipersonnel landmines, by their nature, are inherently indiscriminate weapons. Once emplaced, they cannot differentiate among enemy troops, innocent civilians or the soldiers who deployed them.

The ultimate purpose of combat operations is to achieve a political objective. Inflicting casualties on innocent civilians is not only morally reprehensible, but it also is clearly counterproductive to attaining any legitimate political purpose. Obviously, the deliberate employment of mines to terrorize civilians is contrary to customary international humanitarian law, and would subject those who do so to an international war crimes tribunal.

Moreover, from a military operational standpoint, employing mines has a high potential for fratricide – that is, inflicting casualties on one’s own troops. Combat operations involve extensive rapid maneuver by mobile forces. Other friendly units may move into the minefield because they are unaware that it is there; and even the unit that emplaced the minefield may forget where it is located and maneuver through the area. This happens even with modern forces with high levels of technology. As General Alfred Grey, former commandant of the United States Marine Corps, observed: "We kill more Americans with our own mines than we do anyone else."

Proponents for the utility of antipersonnel landmines highlight their effectiveness in position defense and the protection of installations. However, counterattacks are an essential tactic in conducting defensive operations. So the defending force would limit its own flexibility by employing mine fields. Alternatives to landmines in defensive operations include non-lethal warning devices, for example flares activated by tripwires, and the employment of conventional small arms and other weapons detonated by a defending soldier such as the so-called Claymore.

During the Vietnam conflict, as a division artillery commander and fire support coordinator, I was responsible for the security of a large number of small semi-permanent fire bases and frequent temporary firing positions. I did not allow my troops to use landmines. We employed command-detonated Claymores; this required some soldiers to remain awake on watch, which provided greater security than reliance on landmines which could be circumvented or neutralized by enemy soldiers. Concerning civilians, my motivation was not only humanitarian but also operational. Had curious innocent civilians been killed or maimed by our minefields, it would have alienated the local population and created an incentive for revenge against my troops.

For the defense of sensitive permanent installations, such as power plants, a variety of physical barriers and warning devices can be installed. Employing mines for this type of security runs a high risk of killing or maiming innocent civilians.

Advocates also argue that landmines have an important function in protecting national borders from attack or infiltration. Experience has shown, however, that such defenses are not only dangerous to the country that employs them, by inflicting casualties on its own soldiers and civilians, but also are expensive in terms of the resources required to maintain them. To be effective, protective minefields must be covered by observation and firepower. They also require frequent maintenance and repair when mines are neutralized or triggered by enemy infiltrators, innocent civilians or animals. A study conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross concluded that border minefields have not been effective in preventing infiltration, but that they have resulted in numerous non-combatant casualties and the killing of livestock.

It is not difficult to conclude that the use of antipersonnel landmines is more of a hindrance than a help in military operations in that they create more problems than advantages to the side that employs them. Of at least equal significance is the fact that they cause disproportionate casualties among innocent civilians, which is contrary to international humanitarian law and the law of war. Soldiers have at least as much interest in compliance with the laws of war as civilians.

The principle of "proportionality," referred to in the issues paper we were provided by our conference hosts, is well-established in customary international humanitarian law, which is binding on all nations whether or not they are signatories to the Geneva Conventions or its additional protocols. In conducting a military operation or in employing a weapon, the principle of proportionality requires a balancing of military effectiveness and humanitarian considerations. The standard is whether the resultant damage to civilian objects and/or non-combatant casualties would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantages to be gained.

This is by no means a precise or objective standard; but in the case of mines, it is clear that it is insufficient to justify their use by claiming marginal utility in unusual circumstances. Just as in the case of treaties banning the use of poison gas and biological weapons, consideration must be given to their effect on innocent civilians. In fact, Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, goes so far as to define indiscriminate attacks, prohibited by international humanitarian law, as those "of a nature to strike military objects and civilians without distinction." This obviously is the case with landmines.

The only legitimate military function of antipersonnel landmines is to impede the movement of, or inflict casualties on, foot soldiers dismounted from vehicles. There are other ways of accomplishing that military function without employing antipersonnel landmines, a weapon that places the lives of civilians in jeopardy.

The International Committee of the red Cross conducted a study analyzing the military effectiveness of antipersonnel mines in 26 conflicts between 1940 and 1995. The general conclusions, endorsed by 55 retired and active duty military officers from 19 countries, were that "no case was found in which the use of antipersonnel mines played a major role in determining the outcome of a conflict;" they had "little or no effect on the outcome of hostilities;" they had "limited effect on unprotected infantry;" and while they "had a marginal tactical value under certain specific … conditions, … the effects are very limited and may even be counterproductive."

Two studies by independent research organizations, commissioned by the US Department of Defense, reached similar conclusions. The Institute for Defense Analyses, established to conduct studies for the US Department of Defense, concluded that antipersonnel mines have only "a quite modest military utility." The Dupuy Institute, specializing in research and analysis of issues related to armed conflict by merging operations research techniques with historical trends and combat data, conducted a study at the request of the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the basis of that study and its conclusions, the president of the Institute, a highly respected, recently retired Army combat arms major general, recommended that the US support a total ban on antipersonnel mines.

My conclusions are that antipersonnel mines provide no more than a limited military advantage in special circumstances, and that their use is generally counterproductive. Antipersonnel mines are inherently indiscriminate weapons; consistent with the universally accepted and legally binding principle of proportionality, as well as the standards of additional protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, nations should refrain from their use and adhere to the Ottawa treaty banning their production, stockpiling, transfer and use.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents

 
HOME
Copyright © 2000 
   Last Update| 08/12/06 14:58 |              Internet: ahesa@rocketmail.com   This 
Site Tracked by OneStat.com              VisitorsHit Counter